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THE ENVIRONMENTAL COURT PROPOSAL:
REQUIEM, ANALYSIS, AND COUNTERPROPOSAL
The recent growth and high visibility of what is called "en-
vironmental" litigation have prompted serious debate whether a
special judicial system should be created to handle such matters.'
Several current proposals suggest the creation of a special judi-
cial entity to hear civil actions2 of an "environmental" nature.
The jurisdiction of the specialized court would be limited to
those cases.3
Congress sensed the need for reform in this area several
years ago. In 1972, it directed that the President, acting through
the Attorney General, conduct-a full investigation of the feasibil-
ity of establishing an environmental court system.4 Pursuant to
the mandate, the Attorney General prepared three hypothetical
judicial systems. The first called for the creation of a court to
hear environmental cases generally, with both original and ap-
pellate jurisdiction. The court would have exclusive jurisdiction
over all cases within its compass. 5 The second proposal was for
the establishment of a court to review all federal agency orders
affecting the environment.6 The third model would authorize a
court to review all orders of designated federal agencies. 7 All
three models assumed that the court would have exclusive juris-
diction and would be created under article III as a constitutional
court." The authors of the Report ultimately decided against rec-
'See, e.g., H. R. REP. No. 92-911, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 143 (1972); Whitney, The Case
for Creating a Special Environmental Court System, 14 WM. & MARY L. REV. 473 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Whitney I].
2 There would be a serious problem in conferring jurisdiction over criminal matters
to a specialized court because of the constitutional provision that trial of all crimes shall
be held in the state in which the crime was committed. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. See
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, ACTING THROUGH THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, ON THE
FEASIBILITY OF ESTABLISHING AN ENVIRONMENTAL COURT SYSTEM 11-12 to -13 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as REPORT].
I See generally REPORT, supra note 2, at 11-7 to -12; Rightmire, Special Federal Courts,
13 ILL. L. REV. 15 (1918). Jurisdiction of the United States district courts, the federal
courts of general jurisdiction, basically extends to all cases arising under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331-63 (1970).
4 Act of Oct. 18, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, §9, 86 Stat. 899.
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ommending implementation of any of the proposed models or
any similar proposal.9
This Comment will examine the problems which impelled
the suggestion of a special environmental court and the reasons
for its apparent rejection. An alternative system which attempts
to solve the problems and at the same time avoids the criticisms
aimed at the proposed environmental court system will then be
offered.
I. BENEFITS OF THE PROPOSED ENVIRONMENTAL COURT SYSTEM
A. Uniformity of Law
One of the principal arguments in favor of establishing a
specialized court is that it would increase the uniformity and
certainty of the law. 10 Professor Scott Whitney, one of the chief
advocates of a specialized environmental court," recommended
that the new court system be granted exclusive trial and appel-
late jurisdiction over environmental litigation. 12 This suggestion
follows from his belief that federal environmental law is full of
conflicting decisions. He detailed the conflict 3 by focusing on
the varying results reached by courts of appeals in interpreting
and enforcing the duties set forth in the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA). 14
Supreme Court review is not really a solution to this lack of
uniformity. Petitioning for certiorari is simply too costly, and its
granting too rare, for it to be an effective tool in the general run
of cases.' 5 While the suggestion that a specialized appellate body
can solve this problem is seductive, there is nothing in the pro-
9 1d. VIII-1 to -4. This conclusion was the same as that suggested by the overwhelm-
ing consensus of replies to letters sent to government agencies and private organizations
soliciting comments on the proposed models. Id. A-1 to -2, B-1 to -2.
" See Whitney I, supra note 1, at 486-501. See also Griswold, The Need for a Court.of
Tax Appeals, 57 HARV. L. REv. 1153, 1156 (1944).
This argument is generally applied only to the appellate courts. With the exception
of the Court of Claims and other single-body judicial structures, the policies favoring
ready access to geographically local courts have outweighed the supposed need for uni-
formity at the trial court level.
I See Whitney, The Case for Creating A Special Environmental Court System-A Further
Comment, 15 WN1. & MARY L. REV. 33 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Whitney II]; Whitney I,
supra note 1.
12 Whitney I, supra note 1, at 487. This corresponds to the Traynor proposal in the
tax field. See Traynor, Administrative and Judicial Procedure for Federal Income, Estate, and
Gift Taxes-A Criticism and A Proposal, 38 COLuM. L. REv. 1393, 1427-29 (1938).
13 Whitney I, supra note 1, at 490-501.
14 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970).
s See Griswold, supra note 10, at 1156. See also Whitney I, supra note 1, at 486.
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posed structural modification which would guarantee the de-
sired uniformity.
An existing specialized court, the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals, 16 offers a good testing ground for Whitney's
thesis. If his thesis is correct, the law created by that court should
possess an admirable uniformity and clarity. A recent study of its
functioning indicated, however, that it not only has failed to set-
tie the law, but that it has positively added to the confusion.
17
Extension of this conclusion suggests that the most that can be
said of a specialized environmental court structure is that it
would provide the possibility of improvement over the present
scheme. The question then reduces to whether the uncertain
improvement justifies the structural change.' 8
Furthermore, it is not entirely clear that the legal chaos that
Whitney found prevalent in the environmental field really exists.
Two other respected commentators argue:
Although notable examples of conflict exist, the overall
pattern is one of surprising consistency in the resolution
of the difficult policy questions involved in applying en-
vironmental laws. More consistency might be desirable,
but the small margin of gain hardly seems to justify the
establishment of a separate court system.' 9
Even if Whitney's findings are correct, the inclusion of trial
courts in the environmental court system raises another prob-
lem: whether uniformity at the trial court level outweighs the
policies favoring access to geographically local courts.
Regardless of whether trial courts are included in an en-
vironmental court system, there is no apparent reason why uni-
formity of environmental law is more desirable than uniformity
lb The court is empowered only to hear appeals from final judgments or orders of
the Customs Court and from certain decisions or findings of the Tariff Commission, the
Patent Office, and the Secretary of Commerce. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1541-44 (1970).
17 Metzer & Musrey, Judicial Review of Tariff Commission Actions and Proceedings, 56
CORNELL L. REV. 285, 339-41 (1971).
is The Commerce Court is another example of the rule that structural change in the
judicial system does not necessarily lead to the desired results. It was established to
expedite litigation, create a body of experts, and harmonize agency decisions-just as the
proposed environmental court would be. See REPORT, supra note 2, at B-68 (response of
the Interstate Commerce Commission); Dix, The Death of the Commerce Court, 8 Am. J.
LEGAL HIST. 238 (1964).
As Nathanson pointed out, specialized courts have not displayed notable mastery of
the art of statutory interpretation. Nathanson, The Administrative Court Proposal, 57 VA. L.
REV. 996, 1000 n.16 (1971).
'9 Hines & Nathanson, Preliminary Analysis of Environmental Court Proposal Suggested in
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, in REPORT, supra note 2, at C-I,
C-16 to -17 (footnotes omitted).
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under any other body of federal law.2° Furthermore, it is hard
to ignore the argument that "[a]n environmental court would
tend to encourage proliferation of other specialized courts-
such as for civil rights, welfare, education, health [and] agricul-
ture .... " Our present system tolerates some lack of uniform-
ity among the courts of appeals; it is a fact of life in the federal
court system that there will not be total certainty about what
the law "is." The remedy, if any, should be a general one, reach-
ing all areas and conflicts.
The policy of developing a unified body of federal en-
vironmental law should not constitute a major factor in deter-
mining whether an environmental court system should be
created. The policy may not be as strong as initial reactions
might indicate, and the possibility of improvement is too uncer-
tain to justify the creation of a new judicial body.
B. The Caseload Factor
Another argument in favor of creating an environmental
court system is that our present courts are overburdened, 22 and
that the congestion can be significantly ameliorated by establish-
ing a new judicial body to handle all environmental cases.23 The
classic statement supporting this position was made by Judge
Skelly Wright, who observed that current environmental cases
represent "only the beginning of what promises to be a flood of
new litigation-litigation seeking judicial assistance in protecting
our natural environment.
24
There is, however, serious doubt whether this flood will ac-
tually commence. Statistics from the Administrative Office of
United States Courts indicate that as of June 30, 1973, there
were approximately 845 cases pending in federal courts which
could be identified as "environmental," representing less than
seven-tenths of one percent of the total federal caseload. 25
2 0 See Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the Function of
Review and the National Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 542, 596-604 (1969). But see text accom-
panying notes 90-91 infra.
21 REPORT, supra note 2, at B-8 (response of the American Bar Association).
22 Cf. Carrington, supra note 20.
23 Whitney II, supra note 11, at 49.
24 Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1111 (D.C. Cir.
1971). See also Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640, 642 (2d Cir. 1972).
In direct contrast to these views, some knowledgeable observers believe that the
environmental caseload will decrease as the administrative process begins to adjust and
becomes more responsive. See, e.g., REPORT, supra note 2, at B-8 (response of the Ameri-
can Bar Association).
25 REPORT, supra note 2, at 111-12.
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It is of course true that large caseloads are not necessary to
justify a separate specialized court. For example, only 398 cases
were pending in the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals on
June 30, 1972.26 But while there may not be a large number of
"environmental" cases, they do seem to demand an inordinate
amount of time and expertise. In support of an environmental
court system, the General Services Administration noted:
This agency has been involved in an excess of 400 cases
since January 1, 1970. Seven cases involved significant
environmental issues. One case involved a minor en-
vironmental issue. While this percentage may seem low,
these seven cases are among the most significant cases
involving this agency and are the most time-consuming
and complex.27
As a rule, neither numbers nor complexity constitute com-
pelling arguments for creating special courts to ease the burden
on the general court system. Unless there is some special quality
inherent in a certain class of cases, it would make more sense
merely to devote additional resources to the general courts. The
environmental cases seem to have such a quality: The problems
they present are not soluble by a mere increase in judicial man-
power. Rather, the most difficult problems they create involve
the courts' lack of technical expertise. This suggests not simply
that another entity is needed, but that an expert entity should be
created, one that is not daunted by the complexities into which it
must plunge.
C. Expertise
The bulwark of the proponents of an environmental court
system is the thesis that extant courts do not have the expertise
to handle environmental litigation efficiently. Whitney argues
not that any federal judge or court . . . is not capable,
given "world enough and time," to develop a mastery of
216 Id. I11-13. It should be noted in any case that the relevance of these comparative
caseload statistics to the environmental court controversy is made questionable by the
concentration of much customs litigation around New York City, where the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals sits. Without the specialized court, the District Court for the
Southern District of New York would be the forum for a huge number of customs cases.
Environmental cases, however, may be expected to arise throughout the country, so that
no single court would be overburdened. Thus, to the extent that volume of litigation is a
relevant factor in deciding if specialized courts should be established, the smaller but
more concentrated customs and patent caseload might militate more strongly in favor of
a specialized court, while the larger but more dispersed environmental caseload would
not.
27 Id. B-63 (response of the General Services Administration).
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these matters. Rather, the question is essentially one of
staffing, workload, and efficient judicial allocation of
functions....
Like other special fields of the law, environmental
matters involve highly specialized and intricate ques-
tions which could be adjudicated more efficiently by
courts with expertise acquired from continual applica-
tion of environmental statutes and regulations to tech-
nically complex issues .... [A]lthough existing federal
courts can intellectually grasp the subject matter, given
enough time and effort, to continue to burden general
courts with the increasing volume of complex and tech-
nical environmental cases would interfere with existing
priorities and aggravate the pressures of overcrowded
dockets.
28
Others disagree that this sort of expertise would be a ben-
efit. The most famous stand against specialized courts was writ-
ten by Simon Rifkind. His thesis was that the "expertise" re-
quired in the judicial process is not technical know-how, but
rather "the unique capacity to see things in their context. '29 No
"area" of law should be treated as if it existed in a vacuum; each
"area" is "part and parcel of the whole body of our law."'30 Re-
ferring to the dangers involved in isolating patent law in the
province of a specialized court, he noted:
In a democratic society the law, in the long run,
tends to approach commonly accepted views of right
and wrong. Thereby it continues its hold on the respect
and allegiance of the people-in the last analysis its
major sanction. Once you segregate the patent law from
the natural environment in which it now has its being,
you contract the area of its exposure to the self-
correcting forces of the law.
31
These views are not uniquely applicable to patent law.32 They
apply, mutatis mutandis, to the environmental field as well, stem-
ming "from a conception of the place and function of the law in
a democratic society as the arbiter and mediator of conflicting
28 Whitney II, supra note 11, at 48.
29 Rifkind, A Special Court for Patent Litigation? The Dangers of a Specialized Judiciaty,
37 A.B.A.J. 425 (1951). But see H. FRIENDLY, FEDERALJURISDICTION 156-57 (1973).
30 Rifkind, supra note 29, at 425.
31Id.
'2 Rifkind fully recognized this. Id. 426.
1975]
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 123:676
social interests and demands. A one-function court cannot assist
the law to discharge that responsibility."
33
Whitney and Rifkind are talking past each other. Whitney
speaks of the efficient allocation of resources, while Rifkind is
concerned with the role and function of those resources them-
selves. Logically, Rifkind must be answered before Whitney is
relevant. Whitney seems to have overlooked this point, and he
never deals with Rifkind's concern about the role of the
judiciary. The generalist character of judges is considered a
major strength of our federal system.3 4 "In the long run we will
get better decisions from judges with experience in all areas of
law. Environmental judges would not have the impartial view-
points of district court and circuit judges whose broad experi-
ence can be brought to bear on their cases. 33
Whitney does not confront this point directly. He is primar-
ily concerned with the charge that the judges on the specialized
court would be technicians incapable of deciding the more gen-
eral, nontechnical questions arising in environmental cases. He
argues, "There is simply no valid basis for assuming that en-
vironmental courts would be staffed by judges not competent to
cope with so-called 'mixed' cases or with concepts derived from
other branches of the law."'36 While there probably exists a suffi-
cient pool of qualified lawyers to staff a specialized court with
generalists initially, the evolution of both the law and the judges
is a major concern. If a large majority of the judges' time is spent
on technical issues, they will almost inevitably lose touch with
other areas of the law. Even a court that was once full of
generalists could become myopic if its judges were exposed to
only one corner of the law.
Lacking a discriminating analysis of the various judicial
functions, the proponents of the "expertise" justification for an
environmental court system seem reduced to the claim that the
judge (at any level) must be able to understand the significance
of the technical data before him. On this ground, all agree.
37
The question at issue then becomes how such understanding can
be supplied. Should a new court system be created to fill this




34 Hines & Nathanson, supra note 19, at C-12.
'5 REPORT, supra note 2, at B-10 (response of the Air Quality Subcommittee of the
A.B.A.).
36 Whitney I1, supra note 11, at 39.
37 See, e.g., Hines & Nathanson, supra note 19, at C-12.
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II. THE JURISDICTIONAL PROBLEM
A primary problem in attempting to establish a new court
system is to define the system's jurisdiction. It is a problem which
the proponents of an environmental court ultimately have failed
to solve in any satisfactory manner. The comments received by
the Attorney General's office indicated a widespread fear that
establishment of an environmental court would result in "serious
jurisdictional problems with other federal courts. '38 Many dis-
putes may have environmental aspects; 39 the determination
whether a case is "environmental" will depend on the precise
issues raised, giving rise to the spectre of forum shopping.
40
There is a real fear that
[a]ny court that would have exclusive jurisdiction of the
environmental impact of any action or on matters fall-
ing within the ambit of certain environmental laws
could and probably would end up with jurisdiction over
all the actions of the [Civil Aeronautics] Board since
almost any Board action could have an alleged environ-
mental effect.
41
The fear that an environmental court might decide many
cases in which the environmental issues are minor appears to be
firmly grounded in fact. It would hardly seem logical to de-
nominate actions of the Comptroller of the Currency "environ-
mental." Yet,
[a]s indicated by the recent case of Billings v. Camp,...
Civil Action No. 1366-72 (D.C. 1972) involving approval
without an environmental impact statement by the
Comptroller of the Currency of a national bank's appli-
cation for a branch, almost any action by this agency or
any other Federal agency could conceivably involve en-
vironmental matters .... When an environmental mat-
ter is peripheral to the main issues of a case, such
[environmental] court would be no better qualified
38 REPORT, supra note 2, at V-4.
'" See, e.g., United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures,
412 U.S. 669 (1973), where plaintiffs sought to enjoin freight rate increases allowed by
the Interstate Commerce Commission to certain railroads on the ground that the in-
creases would discourage the use of recycled materials and would thereby be injurious to
the environment. The Supreme Court held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to
enjoin the increases.
40 REPORT, supra note 2, at V-5.
41Id. B-19 (response of the Civil Aeronautics Board).
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-and may be less qualified-to decide the case than
another Federal court would be.42
The chief advocate of the position that environmental juris-
diction can be properly defined is probably Professor Whitney.
His argument is that it may seem impossible to define precisely
what an "environmental" case is, but the courts have been defin-
ing it successfully for a few years now.
Just as there is a common identifying thread per-
meating the diverse litigation before the Court of
Claims, there similarly is a common thread permeating
environmental litigation.... Cases arising under.., the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the Clean
Air Act, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, the
Noise Control Act, the Resource Recovery Act, and the
Coastal Zone Management Act are readily identifiable
as environmental litigation. In the case of citizens' suits
commenced pursuant to federal environmental statutes
providing for them, the environmental aspect similarly
is apparent.43
He argues that since the courts now determine which agency
actions constitute major federal actions affecting the environ-
ment, for NEPA purposes, it can hardly be impossible to identify
cases appropriate for adjudication by an environmental court.
44
In fact, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Council on
Environmental Quality, and the Land and Natural Resources
Division of the Department of Justice seem to have determined
their respective jurisdictions without insuperable difficulties.
45
Whitney's argument is open to sharp criticism. He appears
to have overlooked a major logical gap: judgments about what is
''environmental" may be perfectly adequate for one purpose but
fail totally when the context shifts. It might be reasonable to
allow the Environmental Protection Agency to rough out a de-
termination of its own jurisdiction, since the courts of appeals
will be alert to keep the agency within reason and statute. But
the same looseness in the definitional matrix might be intolera-
ble in an environmental court. Supreme Court review is hardly a
confidence-inspiring method of keeping the court within
42 Id. B-57 to -58 (response of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board) (citation
omitted).
43 Whitney II, supra note 11, at 40 (footnotes omitted).
44 Id. 40-41.
45 Id. 41.
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bounds.46 And the standard doctrine of federal law is that fed-
eral courts have the power to determine whether they actually
have jurisdiction over a case. A finding that the court has
jurisdiction over the subject matter of a suit is res judicata of the
issue, if the question was actually litigated and expressly
decided. 48 Thus, uncorrected jurisdictional "mistakes" may
gradually extend the scope of the court well beyond its statutory
limits. It is therefore imperative that a court's jurisdiction be
more rigidly defined than that of an agency.
The jurisdictional problem cannot be brushed aside by Pro-
fessor Whitney's arguments, cogent though they may be. Other
problems also remain, such as determining the point at which a
tangential or peripheral environmental issue in a pending case
becomes sufficiently important to suggest that the case be liti-
gated in an environmental court. As this point is reached, it
becomes necessary to decide whether it is desirable that "mixed"
cases, even ones with a significant environmental facet, be de-
cided by specialized courts.
III. IMPLICATIONS
The problems discussed above apply with different force to
the three environmental court models proposed by the Attorney
General. 49 The general jurisdiction model50 runs squarely into
the definitional problem. 51 Until it can be resolved, this model is
infeasible. The second model, a new court to review all orders of
federal agencies affecting the environment, 52 runs into over-
breadth problems. Almost anything can have environmental
consequences.53 In addition, the new court might "ignore
social-economic considerations with narrow attention to scientific
and technical details . . . . 54 If it exercised the same limited
scope of review of substantive agency decisions that courts of
46 Cf. Griswold, supra note 10, at 1156 (using this as an argument for creating a new
appellate body in the tax area).
47 C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 16, at 50 (2d ed. 1970).
48Id. 51. Exceptions to this rule exist when the policy in favor of finality of judg-
ments is outweighed by other factors. For example, if a federal statute vests exclusive
jurisdiction of a particular kind of case in the federal courts, a determination by a state
court that it has jurisdiction will not be regarded as res judicata. Id.
4' See text accompanying notes 5-8 supra.
50 This entails establishment of a court to hear all cases deemed to be "environmen-
tal", see text accompanying note 5 supra; REPORT, supra note 2, at V-1.
51 See text accompanying notes 38-48 supra.
52 Text accompanying note 6 supra; REPORT, supra note 2, at V-2.
"a See text accompanying note 42 supra.
54 REPORT, supra note 2, at B-8 (response of the American Bar Association).
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appeals presently do, its significance would be unclear.55 This
model, in effect, shades into the general questions and debate
regarding the establishment of a general administrative court. 56
And in any case, it would do nothing at all to help trial courts.
The third model, an environmental court to review orders
of designated federal agencies, 57 would avoid the jurisdictional
problems of the first model and the overbreadth worries of the
second. The mere delineation of jurisdictional boundaries does
not, of course, make this or any model a desirable one overall. In
addition to failing to address problems at the trial level, this
proposal "would sacrifice much of the rationale for creating an
environmental court. It would leave environmental issues which
arise under other statutes to be decided by the general Federal
Courts. '58 Finally, this model would tend to increase the
nonuniformity of the law by adding, in effect, an "Eleventh Cir-
cuit."
It cannot be denied that the technical nature of many en-
vironmental cases has caused the courts great concern. 59 There
is little reason to believe that the problems encountered to date
will subside. Nevertheless, the establishment of a specialized en-
vironmental court does not seem desirable. The uncertain ben-
efits of such a court are not sufficient to override its countervail-
ing features. The remainder of the Comment will explore alter-
native solutions to the problems which courts face today in deal-
ing with environmental cases.
IV. PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE
A. The Courts of Appeals
The primary function of the courts of appeals in environ-
mental cases is to review the administrative process. 60 The courts
have what is basically a supervisory function:
In the exercise of the court's supervisory function,
full allowance must be given for the reality that agency
matters typically involve a kind of expertise-"some-
5 Id. B-33 (response of the Council on Environmental Quality). But cf. text accom-
panying note 28 supra (expertise).
6 See, e.g., Hines & Nathanson, supra note 19; cf. H. FRIENDLY, supra note 29, at
153-71.
57 Text accompanying note 7 supra; REPORT, supra note 2, at V-2.
.'8 REPORT, supra note 2, at B-35 (response of the Council on Environmental Quality).
.19 See, e.g., Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 502-05 (1971); text
accompanying note 28 supra.
60 See Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L.
REv. 509, 511-15 (1974).
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times technical in a scientific sense, sometimes more a
matter of specialization in kinds of regulatory prog-
rams." Nevertheless, the court must study the record
attentively, even the evidence on technical and special-
ist matters, "to penetrate to the underlying decisions
of the agency, to satisfy itself that the agency has exer-
cised a reasoned discretion with reasons that do not
deviate from or ignore the ascertainable legislative in-
tent." . . .Finally, if satisfied on these points, the court
sustains an agency even though its findings are "of
less than ideal clarity, if the agency's path may rea-
sonably be discerned." The court is not to make its
own findings .... 61
The court is not to evaluate the technical accuracy or validity of
the agency's factual analysis, as it would in a de novo action.
Rather, the court is to ascertain whether the agency has stayed
within the bounds of its statutory discretion.62 If the court is
unable to penetrate scientific language, the best solution is to
remand to the agency. 63
Within this structure, the main "expertise" required of the
courts of appeals is that of the law of judicial review. Going
beyond that requires entry into the morass of arguments con-
cerning specialized, or "expert," appellate courts.64 Two federal
appellate judges have questioned the wisdom of establishing an
environmental court filled with expertized judges. Judge Harold
Leventhal of the District of Columbia Circuit recently wrote:
The desirability of a specialist [environmental] court has
been the subject of active debate recently . . . . I am
skeptical of the proposal....
A second criticism is based on the view of the appel-
late judge's role .... Review to ensure balance, coupled
with restraint on the part of the reviewer, requires a
61 Id. 511 (footnotes omitted).
62 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); NLRB v.
Nevada Consol. Copper Corp., 316 U.S. 105 (1942). See generally 4 K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, TREATISE § 29.11 (1958); Leventhal, supra note 60, at 511-12;
Nathanson, Proposals For An Administrative Appellate Court, 25 AD. L. REv. 85 (1973).
63 See, e.g., Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1972); cf.
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971). But
see Freedman, The Uses and Limits of Remand in Administrative Law: Staleness of the Record,
115 U. PA. L. REV. 145 (1966) (questioning the indiscriminate reliance on this technique).
64 The more general question of the desirability of having all appellate judges ex-
pert in the substantive matters of the agencies they supervise is well beyond the scope
of the Comment. See Nathanson, supra note 18, at 999-1001. See also H. FRIENDLY, supra
note 29, at 182-89.
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generalist who can penetrate the scientific explanation
underlying a decision just enough to test its soundness.
A specialist whose attention was directed exclusively to
environmental issues would tend to intrude his own
judgment on the issues, thereby coopting the discretion
of the agency.6
5
Judge James Oakes, of the Second Circuit, is in accord: "[T]he
current system of review by generalist judges already allows for
the consideration of the best technical expertise in the various
areas of environmental concern.
66
There has been no effective rebuttal to these ideas regard-
ing the function of the appellate level of review.6 7 Professor
Whitney, in his defense of the proposal to create an environmen-
tal court system,68 places most of his emphasis on the potential to
define the jurisdiction of such a system. Although Whitney cites
Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion in Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals
Corp.69 in support of his argument that specialized knowledge is
required by judges in environmental cases°7 0 this does not specif-
ically concern the need for technical expertise at the appellate
level. Wyandotte Chemicals was a case arising out of the Court's
original jurisdiction, and the Justice's remarks on the need for
expertise must be read in that light.
Under section 102(2) of NEPA,7 1 which directs the courts of
appeals to assess the adequacy of environmental impact state-
ments, remand has been the answer to agencies that cannot re-
duce their jargon to English.7 2 And, as Judge Leventhal points
out, appellate courts may gain access to technical experts in vari-
ous ways.7 3 In other words, it is possible to keep the advantages
of generalist courts and still plug in whatever technical input
those courts feel they need.7 4 Furthermore, the court is always
65 Leventhal, supra note 60, at 517-18 (citations omitted).
66 Oakes, Developments in Environmental Law, 3 ENv. L. REP. 50001, 50012 (1973).
67 Dean Griswold, in championing the idea of an appellate tax court, stressed the
need for uniformity of law rather than expertise. Griswold, supra note 10.
68 Whitney II, supra note 11.
69 401 U.S. 493, 510-12 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Cf. the majority's statement:
"The notion that appellate judges, even with the assistance of a most competent Special
Master, might appropriately undertake at this time to unravel these complexities is, to say
the least, unrealistic." Id. at 504.
70 Whitney II, supra note 11, at 42.
71 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (1970).
72 E.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir.
1971); cf. Freedman, supra note 63.
73 Leventhal, supra note 60, at 550-55.
71 Id. 550.
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free to require counsel to submit explanations of technical
matters.
7 5
In light of the nature of the appellate judicial process and
the availability of various methods for providing appellate courts
with technical information and advice, the principle of Ockham's
Razor 7 6 seems determinative; there is not sufficient justification
for creating a specialized environmental court of appeals. Re-
form efforts should focus instead on the trial courts, where the
need for comprehension of complex data is most acute.
B. The Trial Courts
Several recently enacted federal environmental statutes au-
thorize citizens to bring civil actions against any person alleged to
be in violation of either an effluent (or other environmental)
standard or limitation or any order issued by the administrator
of the relevant environmental agency. Actions may also be
brought against the administrator himself when there is an al-
leged failure on his part to perform any nondiscretionary duty.
77
Jurisdiction is vested in the district courts. The traditional model
of environmental litigation involved appellate review of the deci-
sion of an administrative agency which had already made the
requisite technical findings; now, the district courts must embroil
themselves in the technical controversy. The Supreme Court
made this duty explicit in Washington v. General Motors Corp.78
Eighteen states sought to invoke the Court's original jurisdiction
in an action to enjoin the four major auto manufacturers' viola-
tion of federal antipollution laws. The Court declined to exercise
its jurisdiction, and remanded the plaintiffs to their respective
district courts. Those district courts will have to hear evidence to
determine whether specific technical standards have been vio-
lated, and they will not have any presumptively correct adminis-
trative findings to ease their task.
Another case which raises the problem of technical factual
disputes involved a local citizens group's declaratory and injunc-
tive action seeking to prevent the defendants from authorizing
further municipal sewer hookup permits. It was alleged that issu-
ing such permits would result in discharges that would affect the
7 See id. 545-46. See also Leventhal, Cues and Compasses for Administrative Lauyers, 20
AD. L. REV. 237 (1968).
76 Generally: Do not multiply entities beyond that number which is absolutely neces-
sary to the solution of the problem.
77 E.g., Water Pbllution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (Supp. II, 1972); Clean Air
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2 (1970).
78 406 U.S. 109, 114, 116 (1972).
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water supply of the Potomac River. The court, ruling on a mo-
tion to dismiss, held that a cause of action had been stated: the
complaint alleged that allowing further permits would increase
the discharge into the water and thereby violate the applicable
water quality standards.7 9 The case is not reported further, but it
is clear that if such an action were heard on the merits, both
sides would be expected to produce scientific data for the court
to evaluate.
In the environmental field there will thus be a number of
cases in which the district courts will have to weigh and evaluate
conflicting scientific evidence. The question remains how justice
to the individual litigants and compliance with federal law can
best be assured.
1. The Super-Clerk
One proposal that has been advanced is that "expert" law
clerks should be appointed to assist judges in the resolution of
technical factual controversies. Judge Charles Wyzanski ex-
perimented with this approach in United States v. United Shoe
Machinery Corp. ,80 an antitrust suit which raised complex
economic issues. His experience with his clerk, Dr. Carl Kaysen,
a professor of economics at Harvard, is quite instructive.
Judge Wyzanski found the use of an expert clerk quite help-
ful. Dr. Kaysen's analysis of the evidence presented on the rec-
ord enabled the Judge to ask more probing questions of counsel
and the witnesses and more easily to understand the factual
questions in dispute. Judge Wyzanski concluded, "I have no
doubt that I benefited and in my opinion justice was served by
the appointment of Mr. Kaysen.' x Nevertheless, the Judge was
not certain that he would be willing to repeat the experiment.
He expressed the fear that the clerk, by reason of his expertise
in a technical area beyond the competence of the judge, could
exert an undue influence on the decision. In effect, the clerk,
rather than the judge, would be deciding the case.
Dr. Kaysen himself has suggested that there are two strong
reasons why an economist should not again be made a judge's
law clerk.8 2 First, it is unfair to the parties, who have no chance
to attack or rebut the clerk's technical analysis. Second, there is a
19 Montgomery Environmental Coalition v. Fri, 366 F. Supp. 261 (D.D.C. 1973).
so 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
s' Letter from Judge Charles Wyzanski to Bethuel Webster, Oct. 3, 1950, reprinted in
Webster & Hogeland, The Economist in Chambers and in Court, 1958 A.B.A. ANTITRUST
SECTION 50, 67.
82 Kaysen, An Economist as the Judge's Law Clerk in Sherman Act Cases, id. 43.
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possibility that the judge will not be able to make an independent
evaluation of the clerk's reports.
These arguments are compelling. 3 The use of expert
clerks, while lending much needed expertise to the judicial pro-
cess, creates a substantial risk that judges will abdicate their func-
tion to their clerk. The parties to the litigation will effectively be
denied the opportunity to cross-examine a very influential wit-
ness upon whom the judge is likely to rely heavily. Thus, while
the "super-clerk" proposal would provide the expertise needed
at the trial court level in environmental cases, there remain seri-
ous doubts about the overall wisdom of implementing this plan.
2. The Non-Partisan Court-Called Expert
A second proposal which has been suggested is the ap-
pointment by the court of an expert witness.8 4 This proposal
meets one of the objections raised against the use of expert
clerks: the expert will be available to both parties for cross-
examination. However, a number of problems would remain.
If the witness draws factual conclusions in an area beyond
the judge's competence, he would essentially be deciding issues
in the case. That is not the proper role of a witness. Witnesses
are supposed to present testimony to the adjudicator; they are
not supposed to become the adjudicator. Abdication of de-
cisionmaking power to the witness would thus be a problem. If,
on the other hand, the judge can understand the scientific as-
pects of the case, albeit only with the expert's help, he could
presumably also understand the facts with the aid of experts
called by the parties. In that case, the court-called expert would
be superfluous. In fact, his superfluity even extends to cases
whose technical aspects the judge cannot understand: there is no
reason that the judge will understand his explanations better
than those of experts called by the parties.
Furthermore, considerable debate8 5 about the advisability of
8' See generally Webster, The Use of Economics Experts as Witnesses in Antitrust Litigation,
17 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 456 (1962). But cf. Leventhal, supra note 60, at 553-54 (sup-
porting an appellate court's use of a super-clerk in environmental cases).
" This approach was used by Judge William Coleman in a complex patent infringe-
ment suit. With the consent of both parties, he appointed an expert of his own to read
and evaluate the evidence. The expert gave his opinions in open court and was subject to
cross-examination by the parties and the judge. The judge felt that the expert was "of
material aid in clarifying the intricate mechanism of the two devices, and the precise
questions at issue." Specialty Equip. & Mach. Corp. v. Zell Motor Car Co., 96 F. Supp.
904, 910 (D. Md. 1951), rev'd on other grounds, 193 F.2d 515 (4th Cir. 1952), on remand,
113 F. Supp. 161 (D. Md. 1953), discussed in Webster, supra note 83, at 460-61.
8. Compare Griffin, Impartial Medical Testimony: A Trial Launyer in Favor, 34 TEMP. L.Q.
402 (1961) (favoring the use of such experts), with Levy, Impartial Medical Testimony
-Revisited, id. 416 (opposed).
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court-appointed witnesses has focused on the question of the
existence of "impartial experts" and "objective scientific facts.
86
It has been strenuously argued that neither economics 87 nor
medicine8 8 is an exact science and that an expert's testimony in
these areas will therefore inevitably be colored by his own prej-
udices. If this argument has merit when economic and medical
questions are at issue, it also has force in the environmental area,
where questions of fact and policy are intimately interwoven.
3. Masters
A third method of injecting scientific expertise into judicial
proceedings is the use of special masters, as provided for by rule
53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Special masters have
not often been used in federal environmental cases.89 Neverthe-
less, their use offers a potential solution to both the jurisdictional
and the "expertise" problems in environmental cases, without
creating a new judicial entity.
a. The General Outline
The district courts should be authorized9" to make wider use
of special masters whenever the court feels that an issue of fact is
beyond the scope of its technical expertise. The use of special
masters avoids the major criticisms levied against the creation of
an environmental court system, while meeting the need that the
environmental courts were proposed to satisfy.9 1
Masters can be used in the federal courts "only when the
issues are complicated"; non-jury cases, which most environmen-
86 Cf. Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 503-04 (1971):
We already know, just from what has been placed before us on this motion...
that the scientific conclusion that mercury is a serious water pollutant is a novel
one; that whether and to what extent the existence of mercury in natural
waters can safely be tolerated is a question for which there is presently no firm
answer .... Indeed, Ohio is raising factual questions that are essentially ones
of first impression to the scientists.
87 Webster, supra note 83.
88 Levy, supra note 85.
89 One recent, notable exception occurred in the Supreme Court. Although the
parties settled the case (which came under the Court's original jurisdiction), the Court
ordered the parties to pay $50,000 to R. Ammi Cutter, who had served as a special
master in the case. N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1974, at 44, col. 1-2 Cf. Ohio v. Wyandotte
Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 511 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
" To the extent that wider use of special masters in environmental cases would be
inconsistent with present law regarding their use, see text accompanying notes 92-104
infra, the proposed authorization could be made by appellate decision, Supreme Court
rulemaking, or Congressional action.
9i Several of the groups and agencies responding to the Attorney General's request
to comment on the environmental court proposals, see note 9 supra, included the availabil-
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tal actions are, can be referred to a master "only upon a showing
that some exceptional condition requires it."' 92 The limitation has
been rather strictly enforced. The leading case is the Supreme
Court's decision in La Buy v. Howes Leather Co. ,93 which held that
simple docket congestion is not the sort of "exceptional condi-
tion" warranting references to masters. The master can be ap-
pointed only to help the court in a case where such help is
actually needed. He is an "instrument for the administration of
justice [to be employed by the court] when deemed by it
essential.
94
Thus, the use of masters to aid the judge in carrying out his
judicial function is permitted as long as the master does not in
fact assume the judicial role. 95 The fear of abdication to masters
of the judicial function exclusively reserved to the judiciary by
the Constitution 96 is the primary objection to their use. Whatever
intrinsic force this objection may possess is, of course, not limited
to environmental cases.
A master's findings of fact in a non-jury action must be
accepted by the court "unless [they are] clearly erroneous.1'97
The Federal Rules thus explicitly recognize that the "expert's"
ity of special masters as a reason why a new judicial entity was not necessary.
The I.C.C. was generally opposed to the environmental court proposals. It suggested
that "if experience should show that the existing courts are incapable of adequately
handling the scientific matters in environmental cases, then legislative provisions au-
thorizing more liberal use of special masters may be desirable." REPORT, supra note 2, at
B-70 (response of the Interstate Commerce Commission). The General Counsel of the
Treasury specifically adverted to the use of rule 53 to alleviate any possible problems of
technical complexity. He noted that the appointment of masters under the rule "would
provide any needed expertness without removing the decision on other points in litiga-
tion from the existing courts." Id. B-97 (response of the General Counsel of the Trea-
sury).
92 FED. R. Civ. P. 53(b). The rule is of ancient lineage, and is derived from former
equity practice. See Kimberly v. Arms, 129 U.S. 512, 524-25 (1889) (Field, J.) ("[I]t has
always been within the power of a court of chancery with the consentof [the] parties, to
order . . . a reference [to a master] .... The power is incident to all courts of superior
jurisdiction."). Subject to the exceptions stated in rule 81 (applicability of the Federal
Rules generally) and to the special problems raised by rule 71 A (condemnation of prop-
erty), rule 53 now applies to all civil suits. 5AJ. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 53.02[1-2],
53.14[2] (2d ed. 1974). In addition, "[c]ourts have (at least in the absence of legislation to
the contrary) inherent power to provide themselves with appropriate instruments re-
quired for the performance of their duties .... This power includes authority to appoint
persons unconnected with the court to aid judges in the performance of specific judicial
duties .... Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312 (1920) (Brandeis, J.).
93 352 U.S. 249 (1957).
9 4 Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312 (1920).
.1 La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 256 (1957); Hartford-Empire Co. v.
Shawkee Mfg. Co., 5 F.R.D. 46 (W.D. Pa. 1946).
96 Kaufman, Masters in the Federal Courts: Rule 53, 58 COLJM. L. REv. 452,453 (1958).
97 FED. R. Civ. P. 53(e)(2).
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opinion, in a factual area beyond the judge's perceived compe-
tence, will actually have the status of a decision. Both parties will
have the opportunity to see the master's findings, to file their
objections with the court, and to challenge to findings on appeal.
Since the judges can use masters only as aids and not as
replacements, a blanket provision for systematically referring a
particular type of case-such as all environmental cases-would
not be permitted. 98 In McCullough v. Cosgrove,99 for example, the
order of reference had recited that the judge to whom the cases
were assigned was unable to try it because of illness; that all the
parties .desired an early trial; that no other judge was available;
that the calendar of the court was congested; and that the cases
had been pending for a long time and were complex patent
suits.100 Yet the Supreme Court vacated the district court's refer-
ence in a per curiam opinion, citing Los Angeles Brush Manufactur-
ing Co. v. James.10' The James case was one in which a district
court had treated patent cases as a class, referring them gener-
ally to a master in order to unclog its docket. Although the
Supreme Court refused mandamus to vacate the reference, 102
the Court made it quite plain that, with the possible exception of
the necessity of giving criminal cases priority, there were no
grounds to justify reference to a master simply because a case
fell within a given class.1
03
In a later case, Judge Evans of the Seventh Circuit articu-
lated the general policy underlying the Supreme Court's state-
ment:
The District Court seemed to labor under the im-
pression that the words "exception" and "exceptional"
as used in .. .rule [53(b)], are elastic terms, with it the
sole judge of their elasticity. Such a construction, we
cannot accept.
Litigants are entitled to a trial by the court, in every
suit, save where exceptional circumstances are shown.
... Likewise, the litigants prefer, and are entitled to, the
decision of the judge of the court before whom the suit
is brought. Greater confidence in the outcome of the
. Kaufman, supra note 96, at 454.
"309 U.S. 634 (1940).
0 5A J. MOORE, supra note 92, 53.05[2], at 2942.
272 U.S. 701 (1927).
102 Mandamus was refused on the ground that there had not been a sufficient show-
ing of abuse of discretion. Id. at 708.
103 Id. at 706-08.
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contest and more respect for the judgment of the court
arise when the trial is by the judge.
10 4
This language may overstate the case when applied to a
court that must decide purely technical environmental fact ques-
tions. The judge presumably refers only those issues which he
determines are beyond his competence. It is hard to see how the
parties would have greater confidence in the outcome if the
judge decided those factual questions himself. It should be
stressed that the proposal contemplates that questions will
be referred, not whole cases.
It is still the law that reference may only be made when
exceptional circumstances warrant it. A case cannot be referred
merely to relieve a congested court calendar. Neither can a case
be referred solely on the ground that there are complex factual
questions at issue; a judge must at least be familiar with the
complicated and technical aspects of a case in order to rule on
the legal issues involved. Nevertheless, when there are disputed
factual issues which a special master, because of his training or
experience, is unquestionably more competent than the court to
decide, technical complexity is a relevant consideration in de-
termining whether reference is proper. 0 5 Much of the environ-
mental litigation at the district court level may involve complex
technical questions demanding specialized expertise. Although a
blanket reference policy for such cases cannot be justified, many
of these environmental cases may individually warrant reference
on their own account.
b. Jurisdiction and Expertise
One of the main objections to establishing an environmental
court system is the difficulty (at the trial court level) of defining
its jurisdiction. 10 6 Under the proposed plan, this problem could
not arise. The cases, as a whole, will still be tried by the district
courts. Those courts, in the exercise of their sound discretion,
may refer one or more factual issues to a special master. Such
piecemeal reference is explicitly authorized by the federal
rules.1 0 7 By leaving the question of what issues need be referred
104 Adventures in Good Eating, Inc. v. Best Places to Eat, Inc., 131 F.2d 809, 814,
815 (7th Cir. 1942).
10S Fraver v. Studebaker Corp., 11 F.R.D. 94 (W.D. Pa. 1950); Kaufman, supra note
96, at 457.
106 See text accompanying notes 38-48 supra.
107 FED. R. Civ. P. 53(c). See 5A J. MOORE, supra note 92, 53.05[2], at 2959-62
(giving examples).
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to the discretion of the court involved, no formal, general rule of
jurisdiction need be laid down.
A similar analysis applies to the objection that a specialized
court will be unsuited to decide the general statutory and policy
questions involved in environmental litigation. 10 8 Under the
proposed plan, cases do go before generalist courts, and those
courts remain free to apply their accumulated judicial wisdom to
any and all questions at issue. Even if all technical issues are
referred, independent statutory and policy questions remain,
and the court retains the power to dispose of the ultimate issues
in the case.
V. CONCLUSION
It is generally agreed that the establishment of an environ-
mental court system would create more problems than it would
solve. Nevertheless, even the most ardent critics of the proposal
recognize the need to give the present district courts some way to
evaluate the technical scientific data involved in many environ-
mental cases. Several alternative proposals have been considered,
and all foundered upon the same rock: if the resolution of fac-
tual issues is beyond the court's competence, then the advisor
will effectively be assuming the judicial function of deciding the
case.
This fact should not be disguised. It should be acknowl-
edged and dealt with openly within the present judicial
framework. Through the increased use of special masters, fed-
eral courts can obtain nonpartisan expertise to evaluate the fac-
tual scientific material presented in environmental litigation. Be-
cause reference of a question to such a master is left to the sound
discretion of the court, there is no need to grapple with the
abstract, unsolvable question of just what is an "environmental"
case. Finally, preservation of the present judicial structure allows
retention of the accumulated benefits of having generalist judges
deciding questions of statutory construction and policy.
"08 See text accompanying notes 28-37 supra.
